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ABSTRACT
JUDGING CONTINGENCIES ACCURATELY:
THE EFFECTS OF FEEDBACK, PRACTICE, AND SELF-EFFICACY

by
Steven C . Clark
University of New Hampshire, May, 1997

Some psychologists have claimed that people are not good
at judging covariation (e.g., Smedslund, 1963; Jenkins &
Ward, 1965) . This claim, however, has been based on the
results of experiments that may not have been optimal for
promoting judgmental accuracy (Allan & Jenkins, 1980) . Other
psychologists have claimed that people are relatively good
judges of covariation (e.g., wasserman, Chatlosh, & Neunaber,
1983; Wasserman & Shaklee, 1984). Common to most of this
research is an experimental paradigm in which participants do
not ever receive feedback concerning the accuracy of their
judgments.
The two experiments in this dissertation were designed
to promote accuracy in the judgment of contingency by
providing (a) accurate feedback concerning participants'
judgments and (b) practice with judging many contingency
problems. The results of these experiments indicate that
people become better judges of contingency with feedback and

xii
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practice, but do not improve with practice alone. This is
true for positive contingencies (Experiment l) and negative
contingencies (Experiment 2) . Judgmental accuracy was
greatest for extreme contingency problems (AP less them -.75
and greater than .75) .
Self-efficacy has been shown to account for performance
in a variety of domains above and beyond ability. Experiment
1 addressed the relation between self-efficacy, feedback, and
judgmental accuracy. Mean self-efficacy increased over the
course of the experiment for participants in the feedback
condition, but decreased for participants in the no feedback
condition. Participants with high self-efficacy in the
feedback condition showed relatively accurate judgments of
contingency, but participants with high self-efficacy in the
no feedback condition showed relatively inaccurate judgments
of contingency.
Experiment l also addressed whether judgmental accuracy
on one contingency task transferred to judgmental accuracy on
a different task. The results indicate that there was no
transfer in accuracy from one task to another.

xiii
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1
INTRODUCTION

An important prerequisite of adaptive behavior is
sensitivity to covariation. Without some sense of what events
are related, adaptive behavior can occur only by accident.
And having occurred by accident, adaptive behavior will
continue as a matter of chance if one is not sensitive to the
relation between responses and outcomes (Hermstein, 1966) .
Perhaps for this reason, considerable research has focused on
people's ability to judge the covariation between events.
(See Alloy & Tabachnik, 1984; Crocker, 1981; Shaklee, 1983;
and wasserman, 1990) Studied in different ways and for
different purposes, this research has been known variously as
the judgment of covariation, correlation, contingency,
control, and causation. (Covariation is the most general of
the terms and does not denote a causal relation between the
variables. Contingency, the term I use to refer to the
present research, does denote a causal relation between the
variables.) The judgment of covariation has been of interest
to psychologists because it addresses people's sensitivity to
the relation between events.
Smedslund (1963) asked nursing students to judge the
correlation between variables on a number of different tasks.
In one task, the students sorted through a deck of 100 cards
which each contained eight letters: four of them representing
a symptom (chosen from among the letters A, B, C, D, or E)
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and four of them representing a diagnosis (chosen from among
the letters F, G, H, I, or J). Participants judged the
relation between symptom A and diagnosis F based on what they
observed in the deck of cards. Smedslund's results indicated
that his participants were not good judges of the empirical
correlation, leading him to conclude that
normal adults with no training in statistics do not
have a cognitive structure isomorphic with the
concept of correlation. Their strategies and
inferences reveal a particularistic, nonstatistical approach, or an exclusive dependence on
the frequency of [positive confirming] instances.
(p. 172)
Other psychologists have found that people can make
relatively accurate covariation judgments. Wasserman and
Shaklee (1984) presented college students with a scenario in
which a person (Kim) was trying to fix a malfunctioning
radio. Kim's tapping on one of the radio's internal wires and
the radio's intermittent buzzing were presented on time lines
which recorded when each occurred. Wasserman and Shaklee
found that participants accurately judged the contingency
problems.
While Smedslund (1963) and wasserman and Shaklee (1984)
came to different conclusions about people's ability to judge
covariation, their experiments were procedurally similar in
one important way--participants were never informed of their
degree of judgmental accuracy. This lack of feedback is
common to most judgment of covariation research (Hogarth,
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3
1981). Unfortunately, this creates an experimental setting
quite different from the real-world in which we typically
receive feedback (McFarland, 1971) . Further, many experiments
require participants to make only a few judgments. In the
real-world, we make many judgments as part of an ongoing
process. Most judgment of covariation experiments, however,
lack these elements.
My primary purpose in the present research was to
evaluate judgmental accuracy with and without feedback.
Participants judged a number of problems during the
experimental session to assess whether practice would improve
judgmental accuracy. I also investigated the role of selfefficacy in the judgment of contingency and whether there is
a transfer of judgmental accuracy from one judgment task to
another.
A Note, on Variables and Measures of Covariation
Some covariation research has utilized more than two
variables or variables that can have more than two states.
The majority of the research in this area, however, has been
done with two binary variables (Allan, 1993) . When research
is done with two binary variables, all possible combinations
of the two variables can be recorded in a 2 X 2 table (see
Figure 1) . On the top of the table are the two states of one
variable, such as the illumination of a light occurring (0)
or not occurring (no 0) . On the side of the table are the two
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states of the other variable, such as pressing a telegraph
key (R) or not {no R) .
Figure 1
The Cells of a 2 X 2 Table Representing the Response-Outcome Possibilities
Outcome

8
c

O

NoO

R

Cell A

Cell B

NoR

Cell C

CellD

8.
|

Instances of Cell A have been called "positive
confirming" cases because both variables are present or co
occur (R, 0) . instances of Cells B and C have been called
"disconfiming cases" because one variable is present but the
other is not (R, no 0 and no R, 0). Instances of Cell D have
been called "negative confirming" cases because neither
variable is present (no R, no 0).
The example just given cam be classified as a oneresponse one-outcome contingency task (Allan, 1993). In a
one-response one-outcome contingency task (1R/10),
participants cam make a single active response on each trial
(e.g., press a button or do not press it), and then a single
active outcome may result (e.g., a light is illuminated or it
is not illuminated) . In a two-response two-outcome
contingency task (2R/20) , participamts can choose which of
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two active responses to make on each trial (e.g., press
button A or press button B), and one of two active outcomes
occurs (e.g., light Y is illuminated or light Z is
illuminated) . The difference between a 1R/10 task and a 2R/20
task may seem trivial, but Allan & Jenkins (1980) found that
participants made more accurate judgments on a 1R/10 task
than a 2R/20 task. In addition, the above nomenclature of
confirming and disconfirming cases loses its relevance in a
2R/20 task. Instead, there are simply four types of events.
The experiments conducted for this dissertation employ 1R/10
tasks.
The actual relation between two binary variables can be
statistically defined in a number of ways (Allan, 1980) . The
most common measure in the judgment of contingency literature
isAP, the probability of an outcome given a response minus
the probability of an outcome given no response (AP = p [0/R] p [O/no R] or in terms of the four cells of the 2 X 2 table, AP
= A/ [A+B] -C/[C+D]) .AP reflects a one-way contingency or
relation, such as the relation between one's pressing a key
and the illumination of a light. AP values can range from
-1.00 to 1.00. AP = 1.00 indicates a perfect positive
contingency (e.g., a press always causes a flash, a flash
never occurs without a press). AP = -1.00 indicates a perfect
negative contingency (e.g., a press always prevents a flash,
a flash always occurs without a press). AP = .00 indicates
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noncontingency (e.g., pressing has no effect on the
flashing).
There are other measures of covariation which reflect a
joint relation between the variables. When both variables
influence the outcome of the other, x2 and <{> are often used
to statistically define the relation (x2 = N[AD-BC]2 /
((A+B) (C+D) (A+C) (B+D) ] and (j) = square root of x2/N) . These
measures are less common than AP in the judgment of
contingency literature (Allan, 1980).
Research Indicating Judgmental Inaccuracy
Smedslund (1963)
One of the early investigations of the judgment of
correlation was conducted by Smedslund (1963) . He presented
several paper-and-pencil judgment of contingency tasks to
student nurses. The first was the card sorting task that was
described above. This was a serial presentation of the data,
meaning that the data were presented sequentially. In a
second task, participants judged the relation between symptom
A and diagnosis F based on summary information which reported
the cell frequencies for a 2 X 2 table. In a third task,
students sorted through a deck of 100 cards which contained
information only about the presence or absence of symptom A
(+A or -A) and diagnosis F (+F or -F) . Regardless of the task
they were given, students' judgments were unrelated to the
actual contingency. Smedslund reported that to the extent
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that his participants reasoned statistically, they relied
almost exclusively on Cell A cases.
Jenkins and Ward (1965)
Jenkins and Ward (1965) also reported that people are
not good judges of contingency. Participants in Jenkins and
ward's experiments participated in a two-response two-outcome
contingency task (2R/20). Participants could press either of
two buttons and then observe the illumination of one of two
lights. The contingency problems consisted of 60 self-paced
discrete trials. In a discrete-trial task there are clearly
defined trials which each have a period for a response and an
outcome. In Jenkins & ward's experiments, participants
pressed one of the two buttons and then pressed a "test"
button which illuminated one of the two outcome lights. After
one of the lights had been illuminated for two seconds, the
experimental apparatus was automatically reset for the next
trial. Participants completed five contingency problems.
In their first experiment, Jenkins and Ward told some
participants that their task was to "score" as many points as
possible by causing a designated light to illuminate as a
result of their button pressing. Jenkins and Ward told other
participants that their task was to "control" the
illumination of the two lights through their button pressing.
Yoked to these active participants, observer participants
watched the responses and outcomes on a display panel in
another room. Regardless of participants' experimental
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condition ("score" or "control" instructions, active or
observer role), Jenkins and Ward found that there was little
relation between participants' judgments and the actual
contingency of the problems they completed.
In Jenkins and ward's (1965) second experiment,
participants judged the same contingency problems as in
Experiment l and answered additional questions concerning
their ability to control the illumination of the lights. They
also answered questions which addressed their understanding
of the concepts of probability. Again, participants'
judgments were unrelated to the actual contingency of the
problems.
In Jenkins and Ward's third experiment, participants
completed two training problems before completing the same
problems that were used in the previous experiments. One of
the training problems had AP = .00 and the other had AP = .80.
Even after these training problems, participants' judgments
bore little relation to the actual contingencies of the test
problems.

Research indicating.. Judgmental Accuracy
Smedslund (1963) and Jenkins and Ward (1965) concluded
that people are poor judges of covariation. They based their
conclusion on what most psychologists would regard as poor
performance on the part of their participants. In situations
like these, it is easy to say how people fared. But at what
point does one conclude that people are good judges of
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covariation? In other words, what are the criteria of
judgmental accuracy? Even in the articles that suggest that
people are good judges of contingency, there are no universal
criteria for judgmental accuracy. But there are indications
that participants can make relatively accurate judgments,
wasserman. Chatlosh. and NPiinahor MQftD
Wasserman, Chatlosh, and Neunaber (1983) found that
participants made accurate contingency judgments on a freeoperant 1R/10 task. A free-operant task is procedurally
different from a discrete-trial task in that there is not any
sort of inter-trial interval or marker. Instead, participants
can respond at any time during the problem. Outcomes are
presented at the end of experimentally defined sampling
intervals, such as one second.
In their experiments, Wasserman et al. (1983) had
participants judge the effect of their key pressing on the
illumination of a light, recording their judgments on a 201
point scale (-100 = prevents the light from occurring; 100 =
causes the light to occur) . Participants could respond or not
respond at any time during the experiment and were instructed
to observe what happened when they did and did not respond.
Each participant completed nine contingency problems in a
randomly determined order. The probability of an outcome
given a response (p [0/R]) and the probability of an outcome
given no response (p[0/no R]) were one of three levels, .125,
.500, and .875. In combination, these probabilities produced
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nine problems with five levels of contingency: AP = -.750,
-.375, .000, .375, and .750.
Wasserman et al. (1983, Experiment l) instructed
participants in one condition to respond by tapping the
telegraph key but not hold it down (tap condition) and in
another condition to respond by pressing the key down and
holding it (press condition). Each problem consisted of 240
one-second sampling intervals. Wasserman et al. found
relatively accurate judgments in both experimental
conditions. For exaxiple, participants in the tap condition
gave the following ratings for the five levels of
contingency: AP = -.750, M = -68; AP = -.375, M = -30; AP =
.000, M = 0; AP = .375, M = 30; AP = .750, M = 75.
In their second experiment, Wasserman et al. (1983)
manipulated both the length of the sampling interval and the
number of sampling intervals. In one condition, participants
had 240 one-second sampling intervals per problem. In a
second condition, participants had 60 one-second sampling
intervals. And in a third condition, participants had 60
four-second sampling intervals. Participants in all three
conditions made accurate judgments of contingency.
In their third experiment, Wasserman et al. (1983)
manipulated the nature of the sampling interval. In one
condition, the sampling interval was a fixed three seconds,
in the other condition, the sampling interval was three
seconds on average, but any given interval could be one,
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three, or five seconds long. Again, participants provided
judgments that were sensitive to the actual level of
contingency in the problems.
Wasserman and Shaklee (1984)
Wasserman and Shaklee (1984) explored the effects of
presenting contingency information in several different
paper-and-pencil formats. Some prior research indicated that
judgments of contingency are more accurate when the data are
presented in a summary table than when they are presented
serially (e.g., sorting through a stack of cards). Wasserman
and Shaklee proposed that this difference in accuracy may be
due to the added memory demands of the serial presentation.
When participants see data presented serially, they must not
only make a judgment, but they must also try to count and
then recall the frequencies of the events. Wasserman and
Shaklee designed their experiments to compare summary table
presentation and serial presentation in a setting in which
the two tasks had similar memory demands. They used time
lines which recorded on a single page all of the data for an
entire problem.
Wasserman and Shaklee (1984) conducted four experiments
in which participants judged 24 contingency problems,
recording their judgments on a nine point scale (-4 =

prevents-the .sound from occurring; o = has no effect: 4 =
causes the sound to occur) . The probability of an outcome
given a response (p [0/R]) and the probability of an outcome
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given no response (p[O/no R]) were one of five levels: .00,
.25, .50, .75, and 1.00. In combination, these probabilities
produced 24 problems with nine levels of contingency: AP =
-1.00, -.75, -.50, -.25, .00, .25, .50, .75, and 1.00.
Participants’ judgments of these contingencies were
sensitive to the varying levels of AP . For example, in
Wasserman and Shaklee’s (1984) Experiment 2, participants
made half of their judgments based on summary tables and half
of their judgments based on time lines. Wasserman and Shaklee
found that judgments were similar for the two formats. In
both formats, the mean judgments of the participants scaled
the contingency problems. That is, if the task had been to
rank order the contingency problems, the participants' mean
judgments would have put them in the correct order, from
smallest to largest. For example, judgments for the summary
table information were as follows: AP = -1.00, M = -1.44; AP =
-.75, M = -1.36; AP = -.50, M = -.71; AP = -.25, M = -.53; AP =
.00, M = .22; AP = .25, M = .51; AP = .50, M = 1.17; AP = .75,
IS = 1.25; AP = 1.00, £S = 2.44. Wasserman and Shaklee (1984)
found a similar pattern of results in all four of their
experiments.
Attempts to Improve Accuracy Through Training
In contrast to Smedslund (1963) and Jenkins and Ward
(1965), Wasserman et al. (1983) and Wasserman and Shaklee
(1984) found that people make accurate judgments of
contingency. Other experiments have found similar results
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(e.g., Allan & Jenkins, 1980, 1983; Alloy & Abramson, 1979;
Peterson, 1980; and Ward & Jenkins, 1965). There is little
evidence, however, indicating whether people's judgments
become more accurate with experience and training. This is
the principle focus of the present research. To date, only
two experiments have systematically tried to improve
judgmental accuracy through training.
Jenkins and Ward (1965)
One attempt to improve the accuracy of participants'
judgments was undertaken by Jenkins and Ward (1965) . As was
mentioned above, Jenkins and Ward found in their Experiments
l and 2 that participants' judgments of contingency were not
related to the actual contingency of the problems, in an
attempt to improve participants' accuracy in their third
experiment, Jenkins and Ward's (1965) participants corrpleted
two training problems prior to performing the same judgment
of contingency problems as in Experiments l and 2. One of the
training problems had AP = .80. Prior to starting this
problem, Jenkins and Ward told participants, "You will have
very good control over the outcomes by your choice of
responses" (p. 13). Participants were shown a sample answer
sheet that had been marked at 80 (0 = No Control: 100 =
Complete Control) and then they completed the problem. The
other training problem hadAP = .00. Prior to starting this
problem, Jenkins and Ward told participants, "Your choice of
responses will have no influence over which outcome will
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appear" (p. 13) . Participants were shown a sample answer
sheet that had been marked at 0 (0 = No Control; 100 =
Complete Control) and then they conpleted the problem.
As in their Experiments l and 2, Jenkins and Ward (1965)
found that there was little relation between participant's
judgments and the actual contingency of the problem.
One of the reasons why their training may not have been
effective is that Jenkins and Ward’s experimental task was
not conducive to accurate judgments. Jenkins and Ward used a
2R/20 task. Allan and Jenkins (1980) showed in a series of
experiments that participants who have a single response
option (lR--move a joystick or not move a joystick) provide
more accurate judgments than participants who have two
response options (2R--move the joystick to the right or move
the joystick to the left).
Another explanation for why Jenkins and ward’s (1965)
training did not improve judgmental accuracy is that their
training was limited to two problems. This is a limited
amount of exposure to a relatively complex task.
Clark and Benassi (in press)
Clark and Benassi (in press) also provided some training
to participants in a judgment of contingency task. Their
experiment was designed to examine Sherif ’s theory of
contrast and assimilation (Sherif, Taub, & Hoviand, 1958) in
the judgment of contingency. Because Clark and Benassi’s
interest was in judgmental displacement away from anchoring
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judgments, they wanted to establish that participants1
initial judgments were relatively accurate.
Clark and Benassi (in press) gave participants four
contingency time lines modeled after those of Wasserman and
Shaklee (1984) and Newman and Benassi (1989) . The first two
time lines provided an anchor for participants' judgments of
the third and fourth time lines. The initial time lines hadAP
= .00, .50, or 1.00, depending on experimental condition. The
page containing the first time line also had a sentence
indicating to participants the actual value of that time line
on the judgment scale (0, 5, or 10, respectively, on a 21
point scale: -10 = prevents buzzing. 0 = has no effect. 10 =
causes buzzing) . The second time line in each condition was
identical to the first, but the second page did not contain
any information telling the participants the value of that
time line on the judgment scale.
How much effect did exposure to an accurate assessment
of contingency have on participants? The best way to answer
this question is to compare the judgments of participants in
Clark and Benassi's (in press) experiment to the judgments of
participants in a similar experiment. Newman and Benassi
(1989, Experiment 3) also had three experimental conditions
with initial time lines of AP = .00, .50, or 1.00. Their
participants, however, were not given any training in how to
judge the time lines. Newman and Benassi (1989) obtained mean
contingency judgments of 1.58, 4.40, and 8.85, respectively,
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for the three initial time lines. Clark and Benassi (in
press) obtained mean contingency judgments of .89, 4.89, and
9.32, respectively. The mean judgments in Clark and Benassi's
experiment were closer to the nominal value of each
contingency (.00, .50, and

1.00) . This finding appearsto be

due to the training and to the fact that the first

two time

lines were identical. This comparison indicates that
participants in Clark and Benassi's experiment learned from
the first time line. Unfortunately, this experiment does not
provide any data concerning long-term improvements in
judgmental accuracy or how practice might affect judgments.
In the

experiments of Jenkins and Ward (1965)

and Clark

and Benassi

(in press),the amount of training and

the total

exposure to judging contingencies was minimal. Participants
in Jenkins and Ward's Experiment 3 completed a total of seven
contingency problems (only two were training problems).
Participants in Clark and Benassi's experiment judged four
contingency problems (only one was a training problem) . The
present experiments were designed to overcome these
limitations by providing ongoing training (i.e., accurate
feedback) to participants for a large number of contingency
problems.

The Discriminability of.. Covariation
There is evidence from a number of experiments that the
relation between objective and judged covariation may not be
linear. For example, Well, Boyce, Morris, Shinjo, and
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Chumbley (1988) presented participants with three sets of 60
paired numbers. The numbers in each set had a different
objective correlation: .10, .60, or .90. After each set was
presented to participants, they recorded their judgment on a
scale that ranged from 0 (no relationship) to 100 (perfect
relationship) . The mean judgments of participants who
observed the number sets were as follows: x =.10, M = 30.35;
X =.60, M = 32.95; x =.90, M = 57.05. The difference between
mean judgments of the .10 and .60 correlations was 2.6 units,
while the difference between mean judgments of the .60 and
.90 correlations was 24.10 units. Even though there was less
absolute difference between the .60 and .90 correlations,
participants showed more discrimination between them than
between the .10 and .60 correlations.
Bobko and Karren (1979) presented participants with
scatterplots representing correlations of .00, .35, and .64.
Participants estimated the correlation coefficient between
the x and y variables to two decimal places. The difference
between the median judgments of the .00 (median = .00) and
.35 (median = .10) correlation scatterplots was only .10
units. The difference between the median judgments of the .35
and .64 (median = 50) correlation scatterplots was .40 units.
Again, there is evidence of a difference in discriminability
along the covariation continuum.
Clark and Benassi (in press) noted this difference in
discriminability and discussed its implications for
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experiments designed to produce context effects (i.e.,
contrast and assimilation). As an experimenter, one must be
mindful that any "midrange" stimuli are midrange not only in
objective terms, but also in psychophysical terms.
The above examples (Well et al., 1988, and Bobko &
Karren, 1979) and the discussion of Clark and Benassi (in
press) focus on the discriminability of covariation between
.00 and 1.00. What evidence is there concerning the
discriminability of covariation along the continuum from
-1.00 to 1.00? wasserman & Shaklee (1984) reported data that
are informative on this topic. In their four experiments,
they presented contingencies ranging from -1.00 to 1.00 and
found a difference in discriminability between negative and
positive contingencies. In their Experiment 3, for example,
participants examined time lines which presented Kim's
tapping on the radio's wire and the radio's buzzing.
Participants then recorded their judgments on a scale that
ranged from -4 (prevents sound from occurring) to 4 (causes
sound to occur).
Participants in the broken time line condition (a paperand-pencil equivalent of a discrete trial procedure), showed
a difference in discriminability between negative
contingencies and positive contingencies. On problems with an
outcome probability of .50, the following mean judgments were
obtained: AP = -1.00, M = -2.12; AP = -.50, M = .16; AP =
.00, M = .36; AP = .50, M = 1.60; AP = 1.00, M = 3.80. The
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difference between judgments of the -1.00 and -.50 time lines
was 2.28 units. The difference between the -.50 and .00 time
lines was .20 units. The difference between the .00 and .50
time lines was 1.24 units. And the difference between the .50
and 1.00 time lines was 2.20 units.
This pattern of mean judgments suggests two conclusions.
First, there is less discrimination between problems with low
levels of contingency (-.50 to .00) than there is between
problems with high levels of contingency (-1.00 to -.50).
This is the same pattern of discriminability that has been
noted for positive contingencies. Second, there is less
discrimination between perfect negative contingency and
noncontingency (2.48 units) than there is between perfect
positive contingency and noncontingency (3.44 units). This
pattern of results indicates that negative contingencies may
be more difficult to discriminate among than positive
contingencies.
The data of wasserman and Shaklee (1984) suggest that
people are not as good at discriminating among negative
contingencies as they are at discriminating among positive
contingencies. Their results indicate that the psychophysical
function for the judgment of contingency is a gently curving
backwards "s" that underestimates the actual contingency of
the problems. For this reason, the first experiment of this
dissertation was focused on those contingencies that are more
discriminable, specifically, contingencies between .00 and
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1.00. The second experiment was conducted to examine whether
the same pattern of judgmental accuracy would be found for a
more difficult to discriminate set of contingencies
(contingencies between -1.00 and .00) .
Response Rate and Judgmental Accuracy
When judgmental accuracy is the goal, the best response
strategy is to respond on half of the trials. This is the
case because one would want to have an equally large number
of trials with a response and without a response on which to
base one's judgment. Any deviation from responding half of
the time reduces the amount of information for either p(0/R)
or p(0/no R) .
wasserman et al. (1983) found in their Experiment l that
there was a difference in judgmental accuracy as a result of
the rate of response. Wasserman et al. rank ordered their
participants in both conditions (press button or tap button)
according to participants' mean probability of response over
all the problems. They then performed a median split in each
condition. The resulting four groups were press-low, tap-low,
press-high, tap-high, with mean response probabilities of
.17, .23, .37, and .44, respectively.
The press-high (p = .37) and tap-high (p =.44) groups
had mean judgments of contingency that were very close to the
nominal values of the contingencies. The tap-low group (p =
.23) had mean judgments that were relatively accurate for
positive contingencies, but participants in this group
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underestimated the degree of relation for negative
contingencies. The press-low group (p = .17) produced a
flattened function in which participants underestimated the
actual relation of both negative and positive contingencies.
In the present experiments, participants will be
encouraged to respond on about half of the trials to promote
judgmental accuracy. Research by Benassi and Mahler (1985)
found that participants do respond about half the time when
they are instructed to do so. If participants’ rate of
response, however, is as extreme as that of Wasserman et
al.'s (1983) tap-low or press-low groups, their judgmental
accuracy should diminish.

Self-Efficacy
Self-efficacy (Bandura, 1986) refers to the extent to
which people are confident they possess the ability to
successfully perform certain behaviors. Self-efficacy has
been shown to influence performance on a number of tasks and
has been shown to have an effect above and beyond general
ability (Bandura, 1990) .
For example, Collins (as reported in Bandura, 1990)
found that belief in one's mathematical ability influenced
performance on a difficult problem-solving task at all levels
of ability. She selected children with high, medium, or low
levels of mathematical ability and then determined their
level of mathematical self-efficacy. Actual ability was an
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important factor in performance on the problem-solving task,
but at each level of actual ability there was a difference
between children who expressed high and low self-efficacy.

(I

have estimated the following percentages from Bandura's
Figure 14.4.) Children with low mathematical ability who
expressed high self-efficacy solved 42% of the problems,
while those who expressed low self-efficacy solved 19%. There
was a 23 unit difference between the two groups. At the
medium level of mathematical ability, children who expressed
high self-efficacy solved 48% of the problems, and the
children who expressed low self-efficacy solved 29%: a
difference of 19 units. Among the children with a high level
of mathematical ability, there was still a difference between
those who expressed high self-efficacy (67% solved) and low
self-efficacy (58% solved), but the difference between them
was only 9 units.
The results of Collins (as reported in Bandura, 1990)
indicate that at all levels of ability, self-efficacy had an
effect on the performance of a difficult task. In the present
research, it is predicted that high self-efficacy should lead
to more judgmental accuracy.
Bandura and Wood (1989) found that participants who were
informed that an experimental task was easy and who were
given low performance standards showed increasing levels of
self-efficacy during the course of their experiment.
Conversely, participants who were informed that the task was
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difficult and who were given high performance standards
showed decreasing levels of self-efficacy over the course of
their experiment. In the present research, the judgment tasks
are relatively difficult, but no information will be given to
participants with respect to how difficult they are. One
dimension of difficulty, however, might be whether
participants receive feedback concerning their judgments. If
participants have no knowledge of how well they are doing,
this might make the task more difficult. In the present
research, the self-efficacy scales will be administered
several times to find whether self-efficacy changes as a
result of receiving feedback about one's judgmental accuracy.
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EXPERIMENT 1 METHODS

In Experiment 1, my principle focus was to investigate
the effects of receiving feedback versus not receiving
feedback on judgments of positive contingencies. Participants
completed three sets of seven problems in a discrete-trial
format and one set of 14 problems in a summary table format.
During the discrete-trial format, half of the participants
received feedback after each problem while the other half did
not. No feedback was given during the summary table task.
This experiment was also designed to investigate whether
increased exposure to a judgment of contingency task would
improve judgments. It may be that exposure to a judgment of
contingency task and multiple problems will improve
judgmental accuracy. In addition, this experiment was
designed to investigate whether feedback has an effect on
self-efficacy. Last, the inclusion of the summary table task
allows for an assessment of whether accuracy on one judgment
of contingency task transfers to accuracy on a different
contingency task.
Research Participants
Eighty-six undergraduate students enrolled in
introductory psychology courses participated in this
experiment to fulfill a requirement. They were randomly
assigned to experimental conditions with the restriction that
the feedback and no feedback conditions contain am equal
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number of participants. Each student was recruited for two
hours of participation.

Materials
The materials consisted of self-efficacy scales,
contingency problems, and an open-ended question about
judgment strategy.
The self-efficacy scales were adapted from Bandura and
Wood (1989) . They consisted of four items on which
participants reported how confident they were that they could
make more accurate judgments than 20%, 40%, 60%, and 80% of
the participants in the experiment. Participant responses
were based on a nine-point scale (l = no confidence. 5 = some

confidence, 9 = complete confidence). The self-efficacy
scales were presented after participants had completed a
practice problem and at the conclusion of each set of
contingency problems.
The discrete-trial contingency problems were presented
by means of a HyperCard program on Macintosh computers. Each
contingency problem consisted of 24 three-second trials, with
a half-second blank screen between trials. Participants could
respond (press the space bar) at any time during the three
second trial. At the end of each trial, the screen would
either flash or not flash based on the participant's response
and the programmed probabilities. At the end of each problem,
participants provided a judgment of contingency in response
to the question, "What was the effect of your behavior
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(pressing and not pressing on the space bar) on the screen's
flashing?" Judgments were based on a 201 point scale (-100 =
prevents flash from occurring. 0 = has no effect. 100 =
causes flash to occur). The HyperCard program recorded each
response, outcome, and judgment.
After each judgment of a discrete trial problem (except
a practice problem), participants in the feedback condition
received information concerning their accuracy. A window
appeared which informed than of the actual contingency of the
problem and how much their judgment deviated from that value.
The summary table contingency problems were based on
materials used by Wasserman and Shaklee (1984) . Wasserman and
Shaklee presented a problem in which a person (Kim) is trying
to find the cause of her radio's occasional buzzing by
pressing on one of its internal wires. The table summarizes
the number of times that each response-outcome possibility
occurred during a given problem. Participants' judgments of
these problems were made in response to the question "If you
were Kim, what would you conclude was the effect of your
behavior (tapping and not tapping on the wire) on the radio's
buzzing?", and were based on a 9 point scale (-4 = prevents
sound from occurring. 0 = has no effect. 4 = causes sound to
£££U£).
The open-ended question solicited people's judgment
strategy for the previous set of problems: "Please describe
below how you made your judgments on the last seven problems.
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That is, on what did you base your evaluations?” Participants
were given a full sheet of paper on which to write their
response.
Contingency Problems
Each contingency problem consisted of 24 trials. During
each trial there was an opportunity for a response (R or no
R) and an outcome (0 or no 0) . There were seven contingency
problems in the discrete-trial task. The problems had
programmedA p values evenly spaced between .00 to 1.00. The
problems were also programmed so that there would be an
outcome frequency of .50 given a response frequency of .50.
The programmed problems are presented in Table 1.
Table 1
Programmed Contingency Problems For The Discrete-Trial Task In Experiment 1
AP

p(0/R)

p(0/no R)

.00
.16
.34
.50
.66
.84
1.00

.50
.58
.67
.75
.83
.92
1.00

.50
.42
.33
.25
.17
.08
.00

The actual AP of the problems could differ from the
programmed AP values because of the number of trials per
problem and the probabilistic nature of the computer program.
Whether a flash occurs is based on the programmed
probabilities for that problem. If the programmed probability
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for an outcome given a response is .67 [p(0/R) = .67] , it means
that on any given trial when there is a response, there is a
.67 chance that the screen will flash. This means that there
is a .33 chance that the screen will not flash even though
there was a response, with a large number of trials, the
actual frequency of an outcome would be very close to the
programmed probability, but with a small sample of 24 trials,
there is a difference on some problems. In addition, if a
participant responds a great deal or very little on a
particular problem, the actual AP may vary from the
programmed AP because of the small sample size for p(0/R) or
P(0/no R).
The seven problems were presented in five different
random orders to assess whether there would be any order or
context effects. Analyses of judgmental accuracy as a result
of problem order revealed no systematic bias.
In the summary table task, the number of times that each
response-outcome possibility occurred during a given problem
was summarized for participants. The 14 problems used in this
experiment are the 14 problems from Wasserman and Shaklee
(1984) that hadAP values from .00 to 1.00. The problems had
outcome frequencies ranging from .125 to 1.00 and had a
response frequency of .50. The 14 problems were presented in
a single random order to all participants. The problems are
listed in Table 2.
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Table 2
Contingency Problems Used In The Summary Table Task in Experiment 1
AP

p(0/R)

1.00
.75
.50
.25
.75
.50
.25
.00
.50
.25
.00
.25
.00
.00

1.00
.75
.50
.25
1.00
.75
.50
.25
1.00
.75
.50
1.00
.75
1.00

m

p(0/no R)
.00
.00
.00
.00
.25
.25
.25
.25
.50
.50
.50
.75
.75
1.00

.500
.375
.250
.125
.625
.500
.375
.250
.750
.625
.500
.875
.750
1.000

Note. Table is based on Wasserman and Shaklee's (1984) Table 1.

Procedure
Participants were randomly assigned to a feedback or a
no feedback condition. They were given the following
instructions for the discrete-trial task at the beginning of
the experiment (adapted from Wasserman et al., [1983] and
Wasserman & Shaklee [1984]) .
The aim of this experiment is to see how people
judge the relationship between their actions and
the consequences of those actions. In the seven
problems that follow, the same basic question is
posed: What is the relation between your pressing
the space bar and the occurrence of a brief
flashing on the computer screen? The seven problems
differ only in the particular relationship between
your pressing and the occurrence of the flash. For
each of the seven problems, please rate the degree
to which your pressing affects the rate of the
screen's flashing, from "prevents the flash from
occurring" to "causes the flash to occur."
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Each of the seven problems will take about 2
minutes. Each problem consists of 24 three-second
trials. During each three-second trial you can
either press the space bar or you can refrain from
pressing it. At the end of each trial the screen
may flash or it may not. Depending on your response
and the screen's outcome, there are four responseoutcome possibilities: Press-Flash, Press-No Flash,
No Press-Flash, and No Press-No Flash. Each trial
is separated by a half-second of blank computer
screen.
To make an accurate judgment you will need to
notice what happens when you press the space bar
and what happens when you don't press it. It will
be to your advantage to press the space bar on
about half of the 24 trials.
After participants read these instructions, they
completed a practice problem, made their judgment of the
problem, and were given an opportunity to ask the
experimenter questions about the task. After their questions
had been addressed, participants completed the pre-task selfefficacy scale, judged the seven contingency problems,
completed the post-task self-efficacy scale, and answered the
open-ended question about judgment strategy. After a short
break, participants judged the second set of seven problems,
completed another post-task self-efficacy scale, and answered
the open-ended question about judgment strategy. Participants
went through these steps again in conjunction with the third
set of problems. After participants finished their third
short break, they were given the following instructions for
the summary table judgment task (adapted from wasserman &
Shaklee, 1984).
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The aim of this experiment is to see how people
judge the relationship between their actions and
the consequences of those actions. In the 14
problems that follow, the same basic question is
posed: What is the relation between Kim's tapping
on the wire of a malfunctioning radio and the
occurrence of a brief buzzing sound that the radio
occasionally emits. The 14 problems differ only in
the particular relationship between Kim's tapping
and the occurrence of the sound. For each of the 14
problems, please rate the degree to which Kim's
tapping affects the rate of the radio's buzzing,
from "prevents the sound from occurring" to "causes
the sound to occur." It is more important to work
through the problems carefully and methodically
than to give quick and offhand reactions.
The next page presented the 14 problems in summary table
format. The response-outcome possibilities were listed along
with the number of times that each occurred for a given
problem. At the top of the page the following instructions
appeared.
After buying a new radio, Kim finds that it emits a
brief buzzing sound every so often. Kim finds this
buzzing sound annoying and decides to find its
cause. Removing the back of the radio, Kim suspects
that a wire may be loose. Kim chooses a wire and
taps on it a number of times in order to see if
this has any effect on the buzzing sound. In the
table below, Kim's tapping on the wire and the
radio's buzzing have been summarized into four
response-outcome possibilities. The number of times
that each response-outcome possibility occurred for
each problem is listed below.
At this point participants judged the 14 problems,
completed the post-task self-efficacy scale, and completed
the open-ended question about judgment strategy. Participants
were then debriefed about the aims of this experiment.
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RESULTS AND DISCUSSION OF EXPERIMENT 1

Data .Screening
The data of any participant who did not complete the
experiment in an appropriate manner were excluded from the
analyses. This rule excluded the data of participants who did
not complete all of the materials, who conpleted the
materials out of sequence, or who did not respond
appropriately on the discrete-trial contingency problems
(either responding on every trial or not responding at all) .
I collected data for Experiment l until there was
complete data from 86 people. The judgmental accuracy of each
participant was assessed as follows. The absolute difference
between a participant's judgment of a problem and the
problem's actual contingency was calculated for every
problem. These absolute difference scores were then averaged
for each of the problem sets. This produced four mean
difference scores for each participant (mean difference score
on problem set l, problem set 2, etc.) .
Data screening revealed same rather extreme difference
scores. One participant in the feedback condition performed
poorly on the first two problem sets, with mean difference
scores of 56.86 and 55.43, respectively. On the third problem
set, her performance deteriorated, with a mean difference
score of 103.57. Because this individual was in the feedback
condition, she probably knew that she was performing worse in
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the third problem set than in the previous problem sets. I am
at a loss to explain this, and can only comment that it is no
small feat to be off by an average of 103.57 points on a 201
point scale.
Because of this individual's extreme scores, X
implemented an across-the-board selection criteria. I
excluded the data of any participant whose set l, set 2, or
set 3 mean difference score was more than three standard
deviations from the grand mean. (Because the mean difference
scores for the Kim problem were based on a different scale,
they were not used in this aspect of the data screening.) Six
participants were excluded from further analyses. The 80
remaining participants are evenly divided between the
feedback and no feedback conditions (40 each), with 16 men
and 24 women in each condition.
Analysis nf the Discrete-Trial Task
Mean Difference Scores on Problem Sets 1. 2. and 3
A repeated-measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) was
performed using SPSS (1990) . The between-subj ect variables
were condition (feedback and no feedback) and participant's
sex (male and female) . The repeated-measures variable was
mean absolute difference scores for the three discrete-trial
problem sets. The means and standard deviations are presented
in Table 3. The significance level for all statistical tests
is p < .05. Any test with p > .10 will not be interpreted.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

34
Table 3
Mean Absolute Difference Scores for the Discrete-Trial Task by Sex (Experiment 1)
Condition
Feedback (n = 40)
Problem Set

M

3D

No Feedback (n = 40)

M

3D

1
Male *
Female 2

19.04
20.27

9.17
9.49

23.37
20.50

10.98
7.44

Male
Female

16.01
17.46

11.09
7.23

22.80
17.51

9.31
7.01

Male
Female

12.18
14.48

8.31
6.75

22.63
20.59

10.29
10.11

z
2

1 There were 16 men per condition.
2 There were 24 women per condition.

T he ANOVA r e v e a le d t h a t t h e r e was no r e l i a b l e m ain
effect or interaction involving the sex independent variable.
The sex by condition interaction was the only statistical
test to produce a p value < .10, E (l# 76) = 2.85, p < .10.
All further analyses collapsed across the sex variable.
A second repeated-measures ANOVA was performed that
examined experimental condition (between-subject variable)
and mean absolute difference scores (repeated-measures
variable) . The means and standard deviations are presented in
Table 4. Participants in the feedback condition were more
accurate in their judgments than participants in the no
feedback condition, E (1, 78) = 7.87, p < .01. There was an
improvement in judgmental accuracy over the three problem
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sets, E (2, 156) = 4.37,

b

< .05. The mean difference scores

of the no feedback condition remained around 20 for all three
problem sets, but the mean difference scores of the feedback
condition improve. This difference in improvement between
participants in the two conditions is confirmed as a
significant interaction between condition and problem set, E
(2, 156) = 4.00, a < .05.

Table 4
Mean AbsoluteDifferenceScores fortheDiscrete-TrialTask (Experiment 1)
Condition
Feedback (n = 40)
Problem Set
1
2
3

No Feedback (n = 40)

M

SD

M

19.78
16.88
13.56

9.27
8.87
7.40

21.65
19.63
21.40

SD
9.00
8.32
10.10

One of the principal questions behind this experiment
was whether feedback would improve judgmental accuracy.
Research by Jenkins and Ward (1965) suggested that feedback
might not improve judgmental accuracy, while research by
Clark and Benassi (in press) suggested that it might. The
results indicate that the feedback provided in Experiment l
inproved judgmental accuracy as evidenced by the decrease in
mean difference scores.
A second question of this experiment was whether
practice at judging a number of contingency problems would
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improve judgmental accuracy. Participants became better
judges of contingency over the three problem sets. This
effect was due to the considerable improvement shown by
participants in the feedback condition. The mean difference
scores of participants in the no feedback condition showed no
systematic improvement. This pattern of results suggests that
practice can improve judgmental accuracy when combined with
feedback, but that practice alone does not improve judgmental
accuracy.
Mean Judgments of Contingency by Level of Contingency
As discussed in the Introduction, the psychophysical
function for the judgment of contingency suggests that there
is a difference in discriminability between different levels
of contingency. Past research has shown that participants
tend to underestimate the objective degree of contingency,
producing a shallow function. This underestimation of the
degree of contingency is the most pronounced for
contingencies between -. 50 and .50.
To assess whether this pattern of judgment held for the
present study, I examined mean judgments of contingency by
the level of contingency in the following manner. I
categorized the problems into seven groups according to
actual AP. The midpoint of each group's interval was the
value of one of the programmed contingencies (.00, .17, .33,
.50, .67, .83, 1.00). The lowest group's interval included
contingencies from - .08 to .08. This interval includes some
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negative contingencies, but none that are far removed from
noncontingency. Problems with an actual contingency below
-.08 were not the focus of Experiment l and did not occur
with great frequency. There were only 115 problems below this
level out of 1680 problems in Experiment 1 (6.85%) . These
problems are not included in the present analyses.
The highest group's interval included contingencies from
.92 to 1.00. This interval is only half that of the other
intervals, but this group still had a large number of
problems. There were 339 problems in this group out of 1680
problems in Experiment l (20.18%). (The midpoint of this
group is .96, but I refer to it as 1.00 group because [a] it
is the programmed contingency and [b] most of the problems in
this group were 1.00 contingencies.)
I calculated the mean actual contingency and the mean
judgment of contingency for each of the groups. These data
are presented in Tables 5, 6, and 7, for the three problem
sets. These data are also presented graphically in Figures 2,
3, and 4. No statistical tests have been performed because of
nonindependence of the data points. Each participant
contributed up to seven judgments per problem set. These data
are presented only for descriptive purposes. (Note that the
number of data points per group and per condition vary. This
is because the groups were defined by actual AP and any
problems with AP lower than - .08 were excluded.)
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Table 5
Mean Actual Contingency and Mean Judgment of Contingency for Problem Set 1 by
Level of Contingency (Experiment 1)
Condition
No Feedback (n = 258)

Feedback (n = 260)
n

Mean AP

Mean Judgment

n

Mean AP

Mean Judgment

36
32
30
40
30
37
55

.02
.18
.34
.50
.64
.82
.98

17.94
31.13
29.90
51.63
49.67
81.51
90.89

28
34
34
39
37
26
60

.00
.18
.33
.50
.69
.82
.98

9.82
6.56
21.32
39.15
76.16
76.73
96.48

Figure 2
Mean Actual Contingency and Mean Judgment of Contingency for Problem Set 1
(Experiment 1)
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Table 6
Mean Actual Contingency and Mean Judgment of Contingency for Problem Set 2 by
Level of Contingency (Experiment 1)
Condition
No Feedback (n = 264)

Feedback (n = 258)
n

Mean AP

Mean Judgment

n

Mean AP

Mean Judgment

22
33
35
44
36
25
63

-.01
.19
.34
.52
.67
.84
.98

6.68
22.91
40.97
44.02
63.11
73.56
94.67

29
39
26
44
44
27
55

.01
.18
.34
.50
.67
.83
.99

6.69
9.26
19.12
43.96
58.96
77.48
95.76

Figure 3
Mean Actual Contingency and Mean Judgment of Contingency for Problem Set 2
(Experiment 1)
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Table 7
Mean Actual Contingency and Mean Judgment of Contingency for Problem Set 3 by
Level of Contingency (Experiment 1)
Condition
No Feedback (n = 267)

Feedback (n = 258)
n

Mean AP

Mean Judgment

n

Mean AP

Mean Judgment

22
36
31
52
32
31
54

.01
.19
.33
.50
.68
.82
.99

3.27
19.31
31.87
49.77
69.47
80.68
97.11

32
37
27
49
36
34
52

.01
.19
.33
.50
.67
.82
.99

7.94
16.24
22.89
38.51
52.89
78.82
90.35

Figure 4
Mean Actual Contingency and Mean Judgment of Contingency for Problem Set 3
(Experiment 1)
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The mean judgment of contingency data show that
participants' judgments of contingency more closely
approximate the actual contingencies over the course of the
three problem sets. This is especially true for the data of
participants in the feedback condition.
In addition, these data indicate that participants' mean
judgments of contingency are more accurate for contingencies
above .50 than they are for contingencies below .50. This
finding confirms what was described in the introduction as
the typical psychophysical function for the judgment of
contingency.
The difference between the judgments of higher versus
lower levels of contingency can be illustrated by calculating
the slope and intercept for the least squares regression line
for all of the contingencies, the contingencies between .00
and .50, and the contingencies between .50 and 1.00. The
results are presented in Table 8. A pattern of veridical
judgments would have a slope of 100 and an intercept of 0.
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Table 8
Slope and Intercept for the Least Squares Regression Line Between Mean Actual
Contingency and Mean Judgment o f Contingency (Experiment 1)
Coefficients for Contingencies Between
.00 and 1.00

.00 and .50

.50 and 1.00

Problem Set 1
Feedback
Slope
Intercept
No Feedback
Slope
Intercept
Feedback
Slope
Intercept
No Feedback
Slope
Intercept
Feedback
Slope
Intercept
No Feedback
Slope
Intercept

75.94
12.59

61.70
16.64

93.95
-.84

99.74
-322

62.24
3.52
Problem Set 2

111.30
-10.92

84.22
6.96

75.11
9.07

103.69
-9.06

96.64
-4.13

74.76
.66
Problem Set 3

106.65
-10.85

97.37
1.12

94.44
1.54

96.08
2.31

88.42
-24

61.10
5.82

111.42
-17.71

In interpreting these data, consider first the data of
participants in the feedback condition. On problem set l, the
slope and intercept are quite different for the low versus
high ranges of contingency. The slope for the low range of
contingencies is shallow (61.70) and the intercept is high
(16.64). The slope for the high range of contingencies is
steeper (93.95) than for the low range of contingencies and
the intercept is near 0 (-.84). The slopes have a difference
of 32.25 and the intercepts have a difference of 17.48. On
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problem set 3, there is only a small difference between the
slopes and intercepts for the low and high contingencies.
There is a difference of 1.64 for the slopes and .77 for the
intercepts. In addition to the two regression lines being
similar, note that the slopes are relatively close to 100 and
that the intercepts are both close to 0.
Next consider the data of the participants in no
feedback condition. On problem set l, there is a considerable
difference between the slope and intercept for the low and
high ranges of contingency. The slope for the low range of
contingencies is shallow (62.24) and the intercept is low
(3.52). The slope for the high range of contingencies is
steeper than 100 (111.30) and the intercept is below 0
(-10.92). The slopes have a difference of 49.06 and the
intercepts have a difference of 14.44. On problem set 3, the
pattern of judgment is basically the same. There is a shallow
slope for the low range of contingencies (61.10) with a low
intercept (5.82) . There is a slope greater than 100 for the
high range of contingencies (111.42) with an intercept well
below 0 (-17.71). Unlike the feedback condition, there is
still a large difference between the slopes and intercepts
for the low and the high ranges of contingency.
It appears that the effect of feedback was to bring
participants' judgments of contingency closer in line with
veridical judgment. This effect produced similar slopes and
intercepts for the low and high ranges of contingency.
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Without feedback, there was no systematic coming together of
judgments for the low versus high ranges of contingency. This
is another source of evidence indicating that judgmental
accuracy does not improve with practice alone.
Difference Score bv Level of Contingency
The first analysis I performed (repeated-measures ANOVA)
examined judgmental accuracy as indicated by mean absolute
difference scores. These mean absolute difference scores
represented the average difference between judged contingency
and actual contingency for the seven problems of each problem
set. This measure provided a measure of a participant's
average accuracy across all levels of contingency.
The second analysis I performed examined mean judgments
of contingency by level of contingency. The mean judgments of
contingency provided a measure of judgmental accuracy for
each level of actual contingency. These mean judgments are
scores that collapse across participants.
In the present set of analyses, I again rely on mean
absolute difference scores between judged contingency and
actual contingency, but these mean difference scores collapse
across individuals and represent mean absolute difference
scores for each level of contingency. These mean absolute
difference scores represent the average difference between
participants' judgments of contingency and the actual
contingencies for each level of contingency. These analyses
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allow a second way to address the differential
discriminability of contingencies.
Using the same contingency groups as in the analysis of
mean judgments of contingency by actual contingency, I
calculated the mean absolute difference score for each
contingency group. These data are presented in Tables 9, 10,
and 11 for problem sets 1, 2, and 3, respectively. The data
are presented graphically in Figures 5, 6, and 7. No
statistical tests have been performed because of
nonindependence of the data points. Each participant
contributed up to seven judgments per problem set. These data
are presented only for descriptive purposes.

(Note that the

number of data points per group and per condition vary* This
is because the groups were defined by actual AP and any
problems with AP lower than -.08 were excluded.)
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Table 9
Mean Absolute Difference Scores by Level of Contingency for Problem Set 1
(Experiment 1)
Condition
Feedback (n = 260)
Contingency
Group

.00
.17
.33
.50
.67
.83

1.00

No Feedback (n = 258)

n

M

SD

n

M

SD

36
32
30
40
30
37
55

22.61
23.16
24.57
21.08
29.23
13.73
8.40

24.00
16.68
17.13
13.56
24.30
15.99
21.59

28
34
34
39
37
26
60

29.43
24.82
30.18
30.05
16.87
16.23
3.32

26.61
24.06
20.09
23.14
9.45
18.46
7.40

Figure 5
Mean Absolute Difference Score by Level of Contingency for Problem Set 1
(Experiment 1)
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Table 10
Mean Absolute Difference Scores by Level o f Contingency for Problem Set 2
(Experiment 1)
Condition
Feedback (n = 258)
Contingency
Group

.00
.17
.33
.50
.67
.83
1.00

11
22
33
35
44
36
25
63

M
19.41
15.70
25.91
20.11
20.17
16.24
4.78

SD
20.40
15.83
15.72
14.81
16.35
21.66
13.27

No Feedback (n = 264)

n
29
39
26
44
44
27
55

M
18.38
26.67
29.04
22.80
23.75
15.70
4.11

SD
21.56
24.72
11.40
21.60
21.98
20.13
14.55

Figure 6
Mean Absolute Difference Score by Level o f Contingency for Problem Set 2
(Experiment 1)
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Table 11
Mean Absolute Difference Scores by Level of Contingency for Problem Set 3
(Experiment 1)

Condition
Feedback (n = 258)
Contingency
Group

.00
.17
.33
.50
.67
.83
1.00

n

M

22
36
31
52
32
31
54

15.27
16.78
15.84
13.87
14.72
12.68
2.98

No Feedback (n = 267)

n
32
37
27
49
36
34
52

SD
16.53
12.08
11.54
11.56
14.16
14.85
8.50

M
21.19
22.03
30.44
28.49
26.47
15.65
9.04

SD
24.54
19.37
20.70
17.77
24.03
21.18
29.62

Figure 7
Mean Absolute Difference Score by Level o f Contingency for Problem Set 3
(Experiment 1)
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These data indicate that the smallest mean difference
scores occur for contingencies in the .83 and 1.00 groups.
This finding suggests that those problems with an objective
contingency greater than .75 support the most judgmental
accuracy (.75 is the lower cutoff for the .83 group).
Participants are not as accurate in their judgments of
problems that are less contingent than AP = .75. This
confirms that there is a difference in the discriminability
of contingencies across levels of contingency.
One pattern in the data was unexpected. In Figure 7, the
mean difference scores for participants in the no feedback
condition are lower for contingencies in the .00 and .17
groups than they are for the middle three groups of
contingencies (.33, .50, and .67). There is no similar
improvement in the judgments of participants in the feedback
condition. This difference led me to believe that
participants in the no feedback condition judged "0" as a
default for any problem that was closer to being
noncontingent than being perfectly contingent. If this is the
case, it would explain the relatively small mean difference
scores for the .00 and .17 contingency groups and the
relatively large difference scores for the .33, .50, and .67
contingency groups. Participants in the feedback condition
would not be expected to show this same pattern of judging
"0"s because they knew that relatively few of the problems
were actual *'0,,s.
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To find out whether my speculation was correct, I found
the number of "0" judgments at each level of contingency. The
results for problem set 3 are presented in Table 12.
Table 12
Number of ”0” Judgments and Total Judgments for Each Level of Contingency in
Problem Set 3 (Experiment 1)
Condition
Feedback
Contingency
Group

.00
.17
.33
.50
.67
.83

1.00

"0"s
4
3
3

1
0
0
0

No Feedback

Total

%of Total

22
36
31
52
32
31
54

"0"s

Total

% of Total

18

12

8
10
2
0
0
0

13
9
7
4

32
37
27
49
36
34
52

38
35
33
14

0
1

11
0
2

In the feedback condition, only 18% of the judgments in
the .00 contingency group were "0"s. This is a marked
contrast to the no feedback condition in which 38% of the
judgments for this level of contingency were "0"s. In
addition, participants in the no feedback condition judged
that over one-third of the problems in the .17 and .33 groups
were "0"s. These participants even judged that over 10% of
the problems in the .50 and .67 contingency groups were "0,,s.
The use of "0" as a default judgment would help account
for the no feedback condition's having smaller mean absolute
difference scores for the contingencies in the .00 and .17
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groups and having relatively larger mean absolute difference
scores for contingencies in the .33, .50, and .67 groups.

Response Rate
Wasserman et al. (1983) found a difference in judgmental
accuracy as a function of participants' response rate. In
their Experiment l, a median split of participants according
to their mean response rate produced four groups: press-low,
tap-low, press-high, and tap-high. The four groups had mean
response probabilities of .17, .23, .37, and .44,
respectively. (Mean response probability refers to the
probability of a response on a given trial.) The press-high
and tap-high groups provided judgments of contingency that
were consistent with the actual contingencies for the
problems. The press-low and tap-low groups were less accurate
in their judgments of contingency.
To assess whether this pattern of judgment is supported
by the present research, I performed a three-way split of
participants according to their mean response rate. The top
third of participants had a mean response rate above 13.74
(mean response probability = .63) . The bottom third of
participants had a mean response rate below 12.66 (mean
response probability = .49.). I then compared the mean
absolute difference score on the three problem sets for the
high and low response thirds. These means and standard
deviations are presented in Table 13.
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Table 13
Mean Absolute Difference Scores on the Discrete-Trial Task for Participants with a High
or Low Response Rate (Experiment 1)
Condition
Feedback (n = 29) 1

M

Problem Set

2D

No Feedback (n = 23) 2

M

2D

1

L
High Response Rate
'i Low Response Rate

17.40
19.27

6.73
8.96

22.77
20.96

9.12
8.58

17.64
12.57

8.50
7.46

20.07
17.70

7.80
6.08

High Response Rate
Low Response Rate

14.89
11.46

7.50
6.98

23.42
19.35

10.27
8.49

High Response Rate
Low Response Rate

1 In the feedback condition, there were 14 participants with a high response rate and 15
participants with a low response rate.
2 In the no feedback condition, there were 12 participants with a high response rate and
11 participants with a low response rate.

A repeated-measures ANOVA was performed that examined
condition (feedback and no feedback) and response rate (high
and low) as between-subject variables. The repeated-measures
variable was mean absolute difference scores on the three
problem sets. There was no systematic difference in
judgmental accuracy associated with response rate, £ (1, 48)
=2.26,

e

< .10). None of the interactions involving response

rate were significant (all p values > .10).
The present research did not produce the same pattern of
results that Wasserman et al. (1983) found. I suspect that
the reason for this difference stems from the different
response patterns in our experiments. In Wasserman et al.' s
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Experiment 1, the press-low and the tap-low groups had verylow mean response probabilities (.17 and .23, respectively).
The press-high and tap-high groups had mean response
probabilities that were within 15 units of an optimal rate of
response (.37 and .44, respectively). In try Experiment 1,
both the low and the high response rate groups had a mean
response probability that was within 15 units of an optimal
rate of response (.49 and .63, respectively).
In sum, the difference between what Wasserman et al.
(1983) found for response rate and what I found may be due to
the fact that most of the participants in my Experiment 1
responded at a near optimal rate. In the Wasserman et al.'s
Experiment l this was not the case.
Self-Efficacy
One of the questions of this research was whether
receiving feedback about one's performance would influence
self-efficacy. A mean self-efficacy score was obtained for
each participant on each of the self-efficacy scales. Because
this analysis examines whether feedback influences selfefficacy, the data from the first and fifth self-efficacy
scales are not included. There was no feedback for either the
practice problem (which preceded the first self-efficacy
scale) or the summary table task (which preceded the fifth
self-efficacy scale).
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The mean self-efficacy scores for the second, third, and
fourth self-efficacy scales are presented in Table 14. Higher
scores indicate higher levels of self-efficacy.
Table 14
Mean Self-Efficacy Scores for Self-Efficacy Scales 2,3, and 4 by Sex (Experiment 1)
Condition
Feedback (n =40)

No Feedback (n = 40)

M

SD

M

SD

Male 1
Female 2

5.72
5.30

1.43
1.37

5.61
5.24

1.14
1.28

Male
Female

6.36
5.43
6.52
5.52

1.73
1.70
1.57
1.48

5.64
5.33
5.27
5.00

1.60
1.78
1.60
1.59

Self-Efficacy Scale

2

3
4

Male
Female

1 There were 16 men per condition.
2 There were 24 women per condition.

A repeated-measures ANOVA was performed with condition
(feedback and no feedback) and sex (male and female) as the
between-subject variables. Mean self-efficacy score was the
repeated-measures variable. Male participants reported higher
levels of self-efficacy than female participants, but this
test failed to reach the p < .05 level, E (l, 76) = 3.41, p <
.07. None of the interactions involving the sex variable had
p values < .10.
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A second repeated-measures ANOVA was performed which
collapsed across participant's sex. The mean self-efficacy
scores and standard deviations are presented in Table 15.
Table 15
Mean Self-Efficacy Scores for Self-Efficacy Scales 2 ,3 , and 4 (Experiment 1)
Condition

Self-Efficacy Scale

2
3
4

Feedback (n =40)

No Feedback (n = 40)

M
5.47
5.80
5.92

M
5.39
5.46
5.11

SD
1.39
1.75
1.58

SD
1.23
1.35
1.58

There was no difference in self-efficacy as a result of
receiving feedback, E (l, 78) = 1.97, p > .10. There was no
main effect for the repeated-measures variable, £ (2, 156) =
l.ll, B > .10. There was, however, a significant interaction
between condition and the repeated-measures variable, E (2,
156) = 3.79, p < .05. For the feedback condition, mean selfefficacy increased over the course of the experiment. For the
no feedback condition, mean self-efficacy decreased.
These analyses reveal two interesting patterns. First,
there was a tendency for male participants to report higher
levels of self-efficacy than female participants. This is
interesting in light of the fact that there was no difference
in judgmental accuracy as a function of participants' sex.
Second, there was no main effect for condition (feedback or
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no feedback) on self-efficacy. The interaction between
condition and the repeated-measures variable revealed that
participants in the feedback reported more self-efficacy as
the experiment progressed.
The above analyses address whether receiving feedback
influences self-efficacy. I conducted another analysis to
assess whether participants with high self-efficacy were
better judges of contingency than participants with low selfefficacy. I calculated mean self-efficacy scores for each
participant over the second, third, and fourth self-efficacy
scales. Participants were selected for this analysis by their
having a mean self-efficacy score on these scales that was in
the top third or bottom third of all participants. The top
third of participants had a mean self-efficacy score above
6.20. (The mean self-efficacy score for these 27 participants
was 6.97. [SD = .54] .) The bottom third of participants had a
mean self-efficacy score below 4.95. (The mean self-efficacy
score for these 27 participants was 4.10 [SD = .77] .) I
calculated the mean absolute difference scores on the
discrete-trial task for these participants (see Table 16) .
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Table 16
Mean Absolute Difference Scores on the Discrete-Trial Task for Participants with High
or Low Self-Efficacy (Experiment 1)
Condition
Feedback (n = 30) 1
Problem Set

M

SD

No Feedback (n = 2 4)2

M

SD

1
O
A*

3

High Self-Efficacy
Low Self-Efficacy

20.04
17.92

9.82
10.23

24.30

20.20

14.42
7.41

High Self-Efficacy
Low Self-Efficacy

13.74
19.61

9.75
7.14

22.44
19.21

10.67
7.86

High Self-Efficacy
Low Self-Efficacy

10.69
16.55

7.76
6.43

25.22
19.96

12.52

8.10

1 In the feedback condition, there were 18 participants with high self-efficacy and 12
participants with low self-efficacy.
2 In the no feedback condition, there were 9 participants with high self-efficacy and IS
participants with low self-efficacy.

A repeated-measures ANOVA was performed with condition
(feedback and no feedback) and self-efficacy (high and low)
as the between-subject variables. Mean absolute difference
scores on the three problem sets of the discrete-trial task
was the repeated-measures variable. There was no difference
in judgmental accuracy for participants in the high versus
low self-efficacy groups, E (l, 50) = .07, p > .10. The
interaction between condition and self-efficacy approached
the p < .05 level of significance, E (l, 50) =3.68, p < -07.
Participants with high self-efficacy in the feedback
condition showed more judgmental accuracy than participants
with low self-efficacy. In the no feedback condition it was
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just the opposite, participants with high self-efficacy
showed less judgmental accuracy than participants with low
self-efficacy. None of the other interactions was significant
(all p values > .10) . There was no main effect for the
repeated-measures variable of judgmental accuracy over the
three problem sets (p > .10) .
Bandura (1986) and Collins (as reported in Bandura,
1990) report that self-efficacy has been shown to influence
performance above and beyond the influence of general
ability. Collins found that children with high self-efficacy
solved more math problems than children with low selfefficacy. In the present research, participants with high
self-efficacy were better judges of contingency, but only in
the feedback condition. In the no feedback condition,
participants with high self-efficacy were worse judges of
contingency than participants with low self-efficacy. Why
were these participants poor judges of contingency? One
reason might be that these participants were confident in
their ability and their judgments to the extent that they
were not attentive to the differences between the problems
they performed.

Analysis of the. Summary Table Task
Mean Difference Scores on the Summary Table Task
An initial assessment of judgmental accuracy on the
summary table task revealed that there was no difference
between the two experimental conditions. Both conditions had
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the same mean absolute difference score (M = 1.03) and
similar standard deviations (feedback SD = .60, no feedback

SD = -51; n = 40 for both conditions) . (This is a small mean
difference score, but it comes from judgments made on a nine
point scale. As a ratio of mean difference score to the size
of the judgment scale, this is equivalent to a mean
difference score of 23 on the 201 point scale used in the
discrete-trial task.) it appears that feedback did not have a
systematic effect on judgmental accuracy on a new task.
Correlation Between Mean Absolute Difference Scores on

Problem Set 2. of the Discrete-Trial Task and the Summary
Table Task
There was no between-condition difference in judgmental
accuracy, but it may be the case that participants who were
accurate on the discrete-trial task were also accurate on the
summary table task. To assess whether there was any
consistency between performance on the two tasks at the level
of the individual, mean absolute difference scores on problem
set 3 (the last of the discrete-trial problem sets) and
problem set 4 (the summary table task) were correlated. The
correlation approached the .05 level, r = .21, p < .07, n =
80. This suggests that participants who were relatively
accurate on one of the tasks were also relatively accurate on
the other task.
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Taken separately, neither the feedback (r = -21, p >
.10, n = 40) nor the no feedback conditions(x = .25, p >
.10, a = 40) approached significance due to the sample size.
Comparison to Wasserman and Shaklee (1984)
The above analyses show little evidence of a transfer of
judgmental accuracy from one contingency task to another. If
there were a transfer, the mean absolute difference scores on
the summary task would be expected to be smaller for
participants in the feedback condition. The discrete-trial
task may still have had an effect on participants' judgments
on the summary task. Whether this is the case can be found by
comparing participant's judgments of these problems to the
judgments obtained by wasserman and Shaklee (1984) . Table 17
presents mean judgments and standard deviations of the
summary table problems from the present research (collapsed
across the feedback and no feedback conditions).
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Table 17
Mean and Standard Deviation (in Parentheses) of Judgments to the Summary Table
Contingency Problems (Experiment 1)
Contingency
p(0 ) 1

.00

.125
.250

-58
(1.44)

.01

.625
.35
(.81)

.875

1.000
Column
Average

1.00

Row Average
-1.06

.28
(2. 11)

-.15
1.29
(2. 12)

.08
(1.41)
1.80
( 1.22)

(.41)
.750

.75

-1.06
(1.82)

.375
.500

.50

.25

3.33
(1.72)

1.71

1.86

2.55
(1.45)

1.16
( 1. 10)
1.65
(1.35)

.69

2.39
( 1. 11)

1.37
1.65

.26
( 1.02)

.01

.26
.46

1.49

1.92

3.33

Note, a =80
1 Denotes the probability of an outcome.
Table 18 presents Wasserman and Shaklee's (1984) data from
their Experiment 4 for the same contingency problems.
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Table 18
Mean and Standard Deviation (in Parentheses) of Judgments to the Summary Table
Contingency Problems from Wasserman and Shaklee (1984, Experiment 4)
Contingency

.00

P(0 ) 1
.125

.25

.50

.75

1.00

Row Average

-25
(1.82)

.250

.68

-.38
(1.35)

.375

-25

.53
(1.40)

.500

-.03
(.47)

1.93
(1.99)
2.78
(.88)

(1.03)
.750

.58
(.92)

.875

1.23
3.10
(1.77)

1.65
(1.35)

1.20

.625

.15

(1.79)

1.99

1.98
(1.35)

1.28

1.58
( 1.20)

1.000

1.57

1.58

.35
(1.26)

Column
Average

.13

.35
.77

1.44

2.36

3.10

Note, n = 40
1 Denotes the probability o f an outcome.

These tables reveal a similar pattern of judgment.
First, they show that participants in both experiments
accurately scaled contingencies. In other words, participants
judged low contingencies to be lower in value them higher
contingencies. Figure 8 presents the mean contingency
judgment for each level of contingency (column averages) for
Tables 17 and 18.
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Figure 8
Mean Judgments of Contingency for Each Level o f Contingency in the Summary Table
Task from the Present Experiment and from Wasserman and Shaklee (1984,
Experiment 4)

— □—

Present Experiment

o —- Wasserman and Shaklee

0.00

0.25

0.50

0.75

1.00

Contingency
Second, participants in both experiments showed a tendency to
give higher judgments when there was a higher outcome
frequency. Figure 9 presents the mean contingency judgment
for each level of outcome frequency (row averages) for Tables
17 and 18.
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Figure 9
Mean Judgments of Contingency for Each Level o f Outcome Frequency in the Summary
Table Task from the Present Experiment and from Wasserman and Shaklee (1984,
Experiment 4 )
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The similarity between the data of the present
experiment and those of Wasserman and Shaklee (1984) is quite
clear. It appears that having been through the discrete-trial
task did not have much effect on participants1 judgments of
the summary table problems.
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EXPERIMENT 2 METHODS

The purpose of Experiment 2 was to assess whether I
could replicate the effects of feedback and practice found in
Experiment l when using a more difficult set of contingency
problems. In Experiment l I employed contingency problems
with A p values between .00 and 1.00. In Experiment 2 I
employed problems withAP values between -1.00 and .00.
I did not collect data on self-efficacy, judgment
strategies, or the transfer of judgmental accuracy from one
task to another. By not including these elements from
Experiment l, this experiment required less time from each
participant. In addition, the length of each trial was
reduced from three seconds to two seconds and participants
were not given breaks between the three problem sets. With
these modifications to Experiment 2, I could recruit
participants for one hour of participation. This allowed me
to collect more judgment of contingency data with my
allotment from the Psychology 401 Participant Pool.

Research Participants
Eighty-six undergraduates enrolled in introductory
psychology participated in this experiment to fulfill a
course requirement. They were randomly assigned to
experimental conditions with the restriction that the
feedback and no feedback conditions contain an equal number
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of participants. Each student was recruited for one hour of
participation.

Materials
The materials consisted only of instructions for the
discrete-trial contingency task. The instructions were
modified slightly from those of Experiment l to reflect the
changes in Experiment 2.
The contingency problems were presented by means of a
HyperCard program on Macintosh computers. Each contingency
problem consisted of 24 two-second trials, with a half-second
blank screen between trials. Participants could respond
(press the space bar) at any time during the two-second
trial. At the end of each trial, the screen would either
flash or not flash based on a participant's response and the
programmed probabilities. At the end of each problem,
participants provided a judgment of contingency in response
to the question, "What was the effect of your behavior
(pressing and not pressing on the space bar) on the screen's
flashing?" Judgments were based on a 201 point scale (-100 =
prevents flash from occurring. 0 = has no effect. 100 =
causes flash to occur) . The HyperCard program recorded each
response, outcome, and judgment.
After each judgment of a discrete trial problem (except
a practice problem), participants in the feedback condition
received information concerning their accuracy. A window
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appeared which informed them of the actual contingency of the
problem and how much their judgment deviated from that value.
The seven contingency problems in Experiment 2 had
programmed AP values evenly spaced between -1.00 and .00. The
problems were also programmed so that there would be an
outcome frequency of .50 given a response frequency of .50.
The programmed problems are presented in Table 19.
Table 19
Programmed Contingency Problems For The Discrete-Trial Task In Experiment 2
AP
-1.00
-.84
-.66

50
-34

-.16
.00

p(0/R)

p(0/no R)

.00
.08
.17
.25
.33
.42
.50

1.00
.92
.83
.75
.67
.58
.50

The seven problems were presented in five different
random orders to assess whether there would be any order or
context effects. Analyses of judgmental accuracy as a result
of problem order revealed no systematic bias.
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RESULTS AND DISCUSSION OF EXPERIMENT 2

Data Screening
As in Experiment l, the data of any participant who did
not complete the experiment in an appropriate manner were
excluded from the analyses. I collected data for Experiment 2
until there was conplete data from 86 people. Judgmental
accuracy was assessed as follows. The absolute difference
between a participant's judgment of a problem and the
problem's actual contingency was calculated for every
problem. These absolute difference scores were then averaged
for each of the three problem sets.
I applied the same across-the-board selection criterion
as in Experiment 1. That is, I excluded the data of any
participant whose set l, set 2, or set 3 mean absolute
difference score was more than three standard deviations from
the grand mean. Data from six participants were excluded from
further analyses. The 80 remaining participants were evenly
divided between the feedback and no feedback conditions (40
each), with 16 men and 24 women in each condition.
Analysis of the Piscrete-Trial Task
Mean Absolute Difference Scores on Problem Sets l. 2. and 3
A repeated-measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) was
performed using SPSS (1990) . The between-subject variables
were condition (feedback and no feedback) and participant's
sex (male and female) . The repeated-measures variable was
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mean absolute difference scores on the three problem sets.
The means and standard deviations are presented in Table 20.
As was the case with Experiment l, the significance level for
all statistical tests is p < .05. Any test with p > .10 will
not be interpreted.
Table 20
Mean Absolute Difference Scores for the Discrete-Trial Task by Sex (Experiment 2)
Condition

Problem Set

Feedback (n = 40)

No Feedback (n = 40)

M

M

SD

SD

1
Male 1
Female 2

20.46
21.79

11.71

Male
Female
Male
Female

10.21

20.53
25.09

10.80
9.06

18.34
15.74

9.02
5.93

19.38
26.36

10.12

18.76
13.82

6.71
5.04

20.87
25.87

10.33
9.29

9.73

1 There were 16 men per condition.
2 There were 24 women per condition.

The ANOVA revealed that participants in the feedback
condition were more accurate in their judgments than
participants in the no feedback condition, E (1, 76) = 10.02,
p < .01. There was no main effect for sex (E (l, 76) = 1.25,
p > .10), but there was a significant interaction between sex
and condition, E (l» 76) = 6.09, p < .05. The women in the
feedback condition were the most accurate group of
participants; the women in the no feedback condition were the
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least accurate group of participants. The men in both
conditions performed similarly.
There was no main effect for the repeated-measures
variable, E (2, 152) = 2.00, p > .10. This indicates that
there was no across-the-board improvement in judgmental
accuracy over the three problem sets. The interaction between
the repeated-measures variable and condition approached
significance, £ (2, 152) = 2.78, p < .07. Participants in the
feedback condition showed a tendency to improve in judgmental
accuracy over the three problem sets. There was no
significant interaction between the repeated-measures
variable and sex, E (2, 152) = .79, p > .10.
For purposes of comparison with Experiment l, Table 21
presents mean absolute difference scores for Experiment 2
collapsed across participant's sex. This table presents
information comparable to Table 4.
Table 21
Mean Absolute Difference Scores for the Discrete-Trial Task (Experiment 2)
Condition
Feedback (n = 40)
Problem Set

1
2
3

M
21.26
16.78
15.79

SD
10.71
7.33
6.19

No Feedback (n = 40)

M
23.26
23.57
23.87

SD
9.92
10.43
9.90
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The data in Table 21 reveal a pattern similar to that of
Table 4. In the feedback condition there is an improvement in
participants' mean absolute difference score over the three
problem sets. There is no comparable improvement in the
judgments of participants in the no feedback condition. A
comparison of these tables also reveals that mean absolute
difference scores are smaller in Experiment 1 than in
Experiment 2. This finding suggests that the positive
contingency problems used in Experiment 1 supported more
judgmental accuracy than the negative contingency problems
used in Experiment 2.
One of the principal questions behind Experiment 2 was
whether I would find the same pattern of results as in
Experiment 1. Just as in Experiment l, feedback improved
judgmental accuracy in Experiment 2. Further, practice alone
did not improve judgmental accuracy for the no feedback
condition.
Mean Judgments of Contingency bv Level of Contingency
As discussed in the Introduction, the psychophysical
function for the judgment of contingency indicates that there
is a difference in discriminability between different levels
of contingency. Past research has shown that participants
tend to underestimate the objective degree of contingency,
producing a shallow function. This underestimation of the
degree of contingency is the most pronounced for
contingencies between -.50 and .50. This pattern of judgment
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was found in Experiment l. To assess whether it would also be
found in Experiment 2, I again examined mean judgments of
contingency by the level of contingency.
I categorized the problems into seven groups by actual
contingency. The midpoint of each group was the value of one
of the programmed contingencies (-1.00, -.83, -.67, -.50,
-.33, -.17, .00). The .00 group's interval included
contingencies between -.08 and .08. This interval includes
same positive contingencies, but none that are far removed
from noncontingency. Problems with an actual contingency
above .08 were not the focus of this experiment and did not
occur with great frequency. There were only 108 problems with
an actual contingency above .08 out of 1680 problems in
Experiment 2 (6.43%). These problems are not included in the
present analyses.
The -1.00 group's interval included contingencies
between -1.00 and -.92. This interval is only half that of
the other intervals, but this group still had a large number
of problems. There were 323 problems in this group out of
1680 problems in Experiment 2 (19.23%). (The midpoint of this
interval is -.96, but I refer to it as the -1.00 group
because [a] it is the programmed contingency and [b] most of
the problems in this group were -1.00 contingencies.)
I calculated the mean actual contingency and the mean
judgment of contingency for each of the groups. These data
are presented in Tables 22, 23, and 24 for the three problem
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sets. These data are also presented graphically in Figures
10, 11, and 12. For ease of comparison to Figures 2, 3, and
4, the axes of Figures 10, 11, and 12 have been reversed so
that an underestimation of contingency falls below the
diagonal that represents veridical judgment. No statistical
tests have been performed because of nonindependence of the
data points. Each participant contributed up to seven
judgments per problem set. (Note that the number of data
points per group and per condition vary. This is because the
groups were defined by actual AP and any problems with AP
greater than .08 were excluded.)
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Table 22
Mean Actual Contingency and Mean Judgment of Contingency for Problem Set 1 by
Level of Contingency (Experiment 2)
Condition
No Feedback (n = 261)

Feedback (n = 261)
n

Mean AP

99
-.82

49
50
34
37
32
32
27

-.68
-51
-34
-.19

.01

Mean Judgment

n

Mean AP

Mean Judgment

-95.18
-71.48
-61.18
-38.76
-27.75
-5.34
4.44

52
31
36
44
35
37
26

-.99
-.84
-.67
-50
-34
-.19

-99.00
-77.13
-55.11
-2852
-3.34
-8.95
-5.39

-.02

Figure 10
Mean Actual Contingency and Mean Judgment o f Contingency for Problem Set 1
(Experiment 2)
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Table 23
Mean Actual Contingency and Mean Judgment of Contingency for Problem Set 2 by
Level of Contingency (Experiment 2)
Condition
No Feedback (n = 260)

Feedback (n = 268)
n

Mean AP

Mean Judgment

n

56
34
38
37
31
43
29

-.99
-.82

-95.04
-77.29
-58.92
-42.08
-30.29
-1836
5.07

51
33
38
43
29
40
26

-.66
-30
-35
-.19

.00

Mean AP

99
-.82
-.68
-31
-34
-.17

.00

Mean Judgment
-99.10
-66.88
-4235
-27.19
-20.86
-5.23
1.08

Figure 11
Mean Actual Contingency and Mean Judgment of Contingency for Problem Set 2
(Experiment 2)
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Table 24
Mean Actual Contingency and Mean Judgment of Contingency for Problem Set 3 by
Level of Contingency (Experiment 2)
Condition
Feedback (n = 2S8)

No Feedback (n = 264)

Mean AP

Mean Judgment

&

Mean AP

Mean Judgment

57
24
36
47
30
37
27

-.98
-.84

-96.49
-8934
-6538
-46.32
-2630
-16.70
3.89

58
27
42
37
34
39
27

-.99
-.83
-.69
-30
-34

-89.83
-81.48
-51.19
-25.16
-633
-5.69
-2.44

-.68
-.49
-35
-.18

.00

o
i

n

-.03

Figure 12
Mean Actual Contingency and Mean Judgment of Contingency for Problem Set 3
(Experiment 2)

-100
-83-

67

-

e
&
£
c

-50-

^

-33-

— □—
-O —

o
o

Feedback
No Feedback

w

c
o
B

au
■3o

-17-

0.00 -0.17 -0.33 -0.50 -0.67 -0.83 -1.00
Actual Contingency

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

77
These data show that the mean judgments of participants
in the feedback condition more closely approximate the actual
contingencies than the judgments of participants in the no
feedback condition. The judgments of participants in the
feedback condition of Experiment 1 were also closer to being
veridical than the judgments of participants in the no
feedback condition.
In Experiment l, participants had a tendency to
underestimate the degree of contingency for problems that had
relatively little contingency (AP < .50.). They had less of a
tendency to underestimate problems that had relatively more
contingency (AP > .50.) In Experiment 2, it appears that
participants had a similar tendency to underestimate problems
with relatively little contingency. Whether there is a
systematic difference in the judgment of lower contingency
problems and higher contingency problems can be assessed by
calculating the slope and intercept for the least squares
regression line for all of the contingencies, the
contingencies between -.50 and .00, and the contingencies
between -1.00 and -.50. These results are presented in Table
25. A pattern of veridical judgments would have a slope of
100 and an intercept of 0.
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Table 25
Slope and Intercept for the Least Squares Regression Line for Mean Actual Contingency
and Mean Judgment of Contingency (Experiment 2)
Coefficients for Contingencies Between
-1.00 and .00

-.50 and .00

-1.00 and-.50

Problem Set 1
Feedback
Slope
Intercept
No Feedback
Slope
Intercept

100.22
8.11

86.97
5.39

113.91
18.79

103.38
13.07

39.99

142.31
42.23

Problem Set 2
Feedback
Slope
Intercept
No Feedback
Slope
Intercept
Feedback
Slope
Intercept
No Feedback
Slope
Intercept

-92

98.70
4.24

93.51
2.92

109.65
13.15

95.97

11.12

59.19
2.16
Problem Set 3

150.23
54.11

105.49
4.89

97.16
3.31

106.63
5.28

102.19
14.47

44.39
1.77

139.84
42.93

In interpreting these data, consider first the feedback
condition. On problem set 1, the slope and intercept are
quite different for the two ranges of contingency. The slope
for the low range of contingencies is shallow (86.97) and the
intercept is low (5.39) . The slope for the high range of
contingencies is steep (113.91) and the slope is high
(18.79). The slopes have a difference of 26.94 and the
intercepts have a difference of 13.40. On problem set 3,
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there is a smaller difference between the slopes and
intercepts for the low and high contingencies (a difference
of 9.47 for the slopes and 1.97 for the intercepts). In
addition to the slopes and intercepts being similar, note
that the slopes are closer to 100 than they were on problem
set l and that the intercepts are both close to 0.
In contrast, note that there is no comparable
improvement in the no feedback condition. On problem set l,
there is a considerable difference between the slopes and
intercepts for the low and high ranges of contingencies. The
slope for the low range of contingencies is shallow (39.99)
and the intercept is low (-.92). The slope for the high range
of contingencies is steep (142.31) and the intercept is high
(42.23). The slopes have a difference of 102.32 and the
intercepts have a difference of 43.15. On problem set 3, this
pattern is unchanged. The slope for the low range of
contingencies is shallow (44.39) and the intercept is low
(1.77). The slope for the high range of contingencies is
steep (139.84) and the intercept is high (42.93). The slopes
have a difference of 95.45 and the intercepts have a
difference of 41.16.
As was found in Experiment l, it appears that the effect
of feedback was to bring participants' judgments in line with
veridical judgment. This effect made the slopes and
intercepts similar for the low and high ranges of
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contingency, without feedback, there was no coming together
of judgments for the low and high ranges of contingency.
This mean judgment of contingency data support the
established function for the judgment of contingency.
Overall, people tend to underestimate the objective value of
contingencies. This is most pronounced for contingencies
between -.50 and .50. This data supports that there is a
difference in the differential discriminability of
contingencies.
Difference Score bv Level of Contingency
In the present set of analyses, I examine mean absolute
difference scores that represent the difference between
judged contingency and actual contingency. These mean
absolute difference scores collapse across individuals and
show the mean absolute difference scores for contingencies of
different levels. These analyses allow for a second way of
assessing the differential discriminability of contingencies.
Using the same contingency groups as in the mean
judgment of contingency analyses, I calculated the mean
absolute difference score for each contingency group. These
data are presented in Tables 26, 27, 28. The data are also
presented graphically in Figures 13, 14, and 15. For ease of
comparison with figures 5, 6, and 7, the horizontal axis
representing contingency has been reversed. Noncontingent
problems are represented at the left of the figure and
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perfectly contingent problems are represented at the right of
the figure.
No statistical tests have been performed because of
nonindependence of the data. Each participant contributed up
to seven judgments per problem set. These data are presented
only for descriptive purposes. (Note that the number of data
per group and per condition vary. This is because the groups
are defined by actual AP and any problems with AP greater
than .08 were excluded.)
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Table 26
Mean Absolute Difference Scores by Level of Contingency for Problem Set 1
(Experiment 2)
Condition
No Feedback (n = 261)

Feedback (n = 261)
Contingency
Group

n

- 1.00
-.83
-.67
-50
-33
-.17

M
5.12

49
50
34
37
32
32
27

.00

22.88
24.15
29.30
26.81
26.09
22.82

Sfi

n

M

m

17.22
39.56
26.16
26.21
18.01
18.06
22.41

52
31
36
44
35
37
26

.92
22.65
33.69
37.71
33.20
26.46
10.96

3.74
37.24
36.01
18.08
18.24
18.17
19.08

Figure 13
Mean Absolute Difference Score by Level of Contingency for Problem Set 1
(Experiment 2)
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Table 27
Mean Absolute Difference Scores by Level of Contingency for Problem Set 2
(Experiment 2)
Condition
No Feedback (n= 260)

Feedback (n= 268)
Contingency
Group

a

M

SD

n

M

SD

-1.00
-.83
-.67
-.50
-33
-.17
.00

56
34
38
37
31
43
29

4.84
14.94
17.24
22.27
23.52
20.98
17.14

26.70
17.94
19.67
15.31
17.76
12.67
15.25

51
33
38
43
29
40
26

.90
27.70
38.95
32.61
34.38
24.40
13.85

3.79
41.43
28.21
20.37
15.28
18.74
18.36

Figure 14
Mean Absolute Difference Score by Level of Contingency for Problem Set 2
(Experiment 2)
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Table 28
Mean Absolute Difference Scores by Level of Contingency for Problem Set 3
(Experiment 2)
Condition
Feedback(n = 258)

No Feedback (n = 264)

Contingency
Group

n

M

SD

n

M

SD

-1.00
-.83
-.67
-.50
-33
-.17
.00

57
24
36
47
30
37
27

3.21
7.71
16.47
20.62
23.17
19.05
16.89

8.99
5.78
1433
19.09
12.02
14.49
19.99

58
27
42
37
34
39
27

8.86
17.89
31.10
40.32
36.44
24.31
8.59

29.43
17.74
26.78
22.29
21.99
13.52
12.68

Figure 14
Mean Absolute Difference Score by Level of Contingency for Problem Set 3
(Experiment 2)

706050403020 i

2
oo
CO
V
u
c

22

.o

Feedback
No Feedback

10
20
-30-400.00 -0.17 -0.33 -0.50 -0.67 -0.83 -1.00
-

-

-

-

Contingency

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

85
These data reveal a different pattern from what was
observed in Experiment 1. In Experiment l, the feedback
condition had mean difference scores that were relatively
consistent across levels of contingency, but were the
smallest for contingencies in the .83 and 1.00 groups
(contingencies above .75) . The no feedback condition had mean
difference scores that were larger than those of the feedback
condition, but they also were relatively consistent across
levels of contingency. The smallest mean difference scores of
the no feedback condition were for contingencies in the .83
and 1.00 groups.
in Experiment 2, the feedback condition has a pattern of
mean difference scores that is similar to that of the
feedback condition in Experiment 1. The mean difference
scores were relatively consistent across levels of
contingency except for the -.83 and -1.00 groups (problems
more contingent than -.75). For these groups, the mean
difference scores were the smallest.
The no feedback condition in Experiment 2 did not have
consistent mean difference scores across levels of
contingency. Instead, the no feedback condition had
relatively small mean difference scores for the -1.00 and .83
groups (problems more contingent than - .75) and for the .00
group (contingencies between - .08 and .08). Further, the no
feedback condition had relatively high mean difference scores
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for the - .67, -.50, -.33 groups (contingencies between -.7 5
and - .25).
I again suspected that participants in the no feedback
condition judged "0" as a default for any problem that was
closer to being noncontingent than being perfectly
contingent. If this is the case, it would help explain why
participants' mean difference scores were relatively small
for the .00 contingency group and relatively large for the
-. 67, -. 50, and -. 33 contingency groups.
I performed the same analysis for problem set 3 of
Experiment 2 that I performed for problem set 3 of Experiment
1. I found the number of times that participants gave a
judgment of "0" for contingency problems at each level of
contingency. The results for sure presented in Table 29.
Table 29
Number of "0" Judgments and Total Judgments for Each Level of Contingency in
Problem Set 3 (Experiment 2)
Condition
Feedback
Contingency
Group
-1.00
-.83
-.67
-50
-33
-.17
.00

"0"s

Total

0
0
0
2
0
7
8

57
24
36
47
30
37
27

No Feedback
% of Total
0
0
0
4
0
19
30

"0"s

Total

1
1
8
15
19
24
16

58
27
42
37
34
39
27

% of Total
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4
19
41
56
62
59
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In the feedback condition, only 30% of the judgments in
the .00 contingency group were "0"s. This is a marked
contrast to the no feedback condition in which 59% of the
judgments for this level of contingency were "0"s. In
addition, participants in the no feedback condition judged
that over 40% of the problems in the -.17, -.33, and -.50
groups were "0"s.
The use of "0" as a default answer accounts for the
participants in the no feedback condition having small mean
difference scores for the .00 contingency group and large
mean difference scores for the -.67, -.50, and -.33
contingency groups.
Overall, the pattern of mean difference scores in this
experiment suggest that there is a difference in
discriminability at different levels of contingency. Further,
these data suggest that the negative contingencies used in
the second experiment are more difficult to discriminate
among than the positive contingencies used in Experiment l.
Response Rate
Wasserman et al. (1983) found a difference in judgmental
accuracy as a function of participant's response rate during
the experiment. This finding was not supported in Experiment
1 of this dissertation. To assess whether it would be found
in Experiment 2, I again classified participants according to
mean response rate over the 21 problems of the experiment.
The top third of all participants had a mean response rate
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above 13.89 (mean response probability = .63). The bottom
third of all participants had a mean response rate below
12.85 (mean response probability = .51) . The mean difference
scores on problem sets l, 2, and 3 are presented in Table 30
for participants with a high or low response rate.
Table 30
Mean Absolute Difference Scores on the Discrete-Trial Task for Participants with a High
or Low Response Rate (Experiment 2)
Condition
Feedback (n = 23) f
Problem Set

M

SD

No Feedback (n = 31) 2
M

SD

1
High Response Rate
Low Response Rate

L
High Response Rate
% Low Response Rate
High Response Rate
Low Response Rate

25.75
21.21

11.40
12.78

25.17
20.71

9.07
10.91

18.40
17.17

5.74
7.89

24.60
19.93

9.21
9.76

15.00
16.38

5.48
7.49

23.96
23.61

8.32
11.86

1 There were 11 participants with a high response rate and 12 participants with a low
response rate in the feedback condition.
2 There were 16 participants with a high response rate and IS participants with a low
response rate in the no feedback condition.

A repeated-measures ANOVA was performed with condition
(feedback and no feedback) and response rate (high and low)
as between-subject variables. The repeated-measures variable
was mean absolute difference scores on the three problem
sets. The main effect for response rate was not significant,
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E (1,49) = 1.42, p > .10. None of the interactions involving
response rate were significant (all p values > .10).
As in Experiment l, I found no difference in judgmental
accuracy as a function of participant's response rate. I
again suspect that this is due to the fact that participants
in my Experiment 2 were responding at a rate that was closer
to an optimal rate of responding than were Wasserman et a l .' s
(1983) participants. Participants in both the high and low
response rate groups in Experiment 2 were within 15 units of
an optimal response rate (.63 and .51, respectively).
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GENERAL DISCUSSION

Principal Findings o£ -Experiments.and. 2
My primary question in conducting this research was
whether feedback and practice would improve participants'
judgmental accuracy. The results of Experiment 1 and 2
suggest that feedback combined with practice inproved
participants' judgmental accuracy on both positive and
negative contingency problems. Practice alone, as evidenced
by the judgments of participants in the no feedback
conditions, did not lead to greater judgmental accuracy.
Experiments 1 and 2 also document the well known
psychophysical function for the judgment of contingency. The
judgments of participants in the no feedback conditions
demonstrated an underestimation of the degree of contingency.
As is typical, this underestimation was the greatest for
contingencies between -.50 and .50. The judgments of
participants in the feedback conditions showed an
underestimation of objective contingency on problem set 1,
but improved in judgmental accuracy by problem set 3.
Judgmental Accuracy and Judgment Strategy
Participants' in the feedback conditions became more
accurate judges of contingency over the course of the three
problem sets. To what should I attribute this improvement?
The obvious answer is feedback and practice. But there is
also a more fundamental question here. How did these
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participants become better judges of contingency? In other
words, how do people make contingency judgments?
Considerable research has addressed this question with
rule-based analysis (Allan, 1993; Allan & Jenkins, 1983;
Wasserman, 1990; Wasserman et al., 1983; Shaklee, 1983;
Shaklee & Mims, 1981; Shaklee & Tucker, 1980; Shaklee &
Wasserman, 1986) . Rule-based analysis is an attempt to
identify which of several judgment rules best describe
participants' contingency judgments. The assumption behind
this type of analysis is that if a particular strategy
describes a participants' judgments, the participant may have
been using that strategy.
Five rules have been identified as possible judgment
strategies (Allan, 1993): conditional probability (AP), sum
of diagonals (AD), frequency of Cell A versus Cell B (Fa -b ) »
frequency of Cell A versus Cell C (Fa -c ) / and frequency of
Cell A (FA ) .
The rule that would lead to accurate judgments in every
case is the AP rule (Allan, 1993). AP is the appropriate
statistical measure for the relation between two binary
variables (Allan, 1980) . It represents the probability of an
outcome given a response (p [0/R]) minus the probability of an
outcome given no response (p [0/no R]) . Some research has
found that people's judgments of contingency are highly
correlated with objective contingency (e.g., Allan & Jenkins,
1980; Alloy & Abramson, 1979; Wasserman et al., 1983;
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Wasserman & Shaklee, 1984) . This correlation, however, does
necessarily mean that people are using the AP rule. Under
some conditions, the use of other judgment rules will lead to
judgments that are consistent with the AP rule.
The AD rule applies only to 1R/10 contingency problems
because it is based on the idea of comparing the number of
confirming cases (Cells A and D) with the number of
disconf inning cases (Cells B and C) : AD = (A+D) - (B+C) . Use of
the AD rule promotes judgments of contingency that are
perfectly correlated with AP when the probability of a
response is equal to the probability of no response (p[R] =
ptno R], or in terms of a 2 X 2 table,

[A+B] = [C+D]) .

For participants to use the AP and AD rules, they must
attend to all of the relevant contingency information (all
four cells of a 2 X 2 table) . Other judgment rules do not
require this. The Fa -b rule is based on comparing the number
of outcomes which occur after a response (Cell A) to the
number of responses without an outcome (Cell B). The use of
this rule provides judgments of contingency that are
perfectly correlated with AP when the probability of an
outcome is equal to the probability of no outcome (p[0] =
.50, or in terms of a 2 X 2 table,

[A+C] = [B+D]).

Use of the Fa -c rule also requires information from two
cells of a 2 X 2 table. This rule is based on comparing the
number of outcomes which occur with a response (Cell A) to
the number of outcomes which occur without a response (Cell
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C) . The use of this rule provides judgments that are
perfectly correlated with those of AP when the probability of
a response is equal to the probability of no response (p[R] =
.50, or in terms of a 2 X 2 table,

[A+B] = [C+D]) .

For participants to use the Fa -b and Fa -C rules, they
need information from two cells of a 2 X 2 table. The use of
the Fa rule, in contrast, is based on the number of times
that an outcome occurs with a response (Cell A) . The Fa rule
is often the reported strategy of participants (Smedslund,
1963) .
In Experiment l of this dissertation, participants were
asked about their judgment strategy at the end of each
problem set. They responded to the prompt: "Please describe
below how you made your judgments on the last seven problems.
That is, on what did you base your evaluations?"
Participants' responses were coded by myself and one of
my former students who helped collect the data. We classified
each response as one of the five rules stated above or
"other." we were blind to participants' condition and
judgmental accuracy as we coded the data.
Our coding revealed that very few participants clearly
state one of the rules as their method of judgment. The vast
majority of responses were classified as "other." There were
so few participants who stated rules that no analyses were
performed on these data.
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One of the problems we encountered was that participants
lacked a vocabulary to clearly describe the basis for their
judgments. Many participants struggled to describe how they
had made their judgments. Even when participants had
described one of the five judgment rules, they often fumbled
for words to state it again after another problem set.
The judgment strategies of some participants suggested
that they based their judgments on formal rules. Other
subjects did not state formal rules and may have based their
judgments on processes they cannot describe. It may be that
an open-ended question about judgment strategies asks
participants to tell more than they know about the processes
of their own judgments (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). This could
be another drawback to the use of open-ended questions.
Shaklee (1983) identified a way to assess participants'
rule use without the problems associated with open-ended
questions. Shaklee constructed a set of summary table
contingency problems in which participants' judgments would
be diagnostic of their judgment strategy. Participants who
used the AP rule could provide accurate judgments of all the
problems, but some of the problems were constructed so that
they could also be accurately judged by use of the Fa , Fa -b ,
or AO rules. Participants' judgment strategies would be
inferred from the problems that they judged correctly. Using
this type of diagnostic problem set, Shaklee and Wasserman
(1986) found that only 3% of their participants showed a
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pattern of judgment consistent with the use of the AP rule.
The most common pattern of judgment among their participants
was consistent with the use of the Fa -b rule (38% of
participants).
How would feedback and practice influence participants '
judgments of a diagnostic problem set such as the one used by
Shaklee and Wasserman (1986)? This is an empirical question
and could be answered with a follow-up experiment. I would
predict that feedback and practice would bring participants'
judgments in line with the AP rule. An experiment of this
sort would introduce the use of feedback and practice into
the rule-based judgment literature.

Directions, for .Future-Research
In addition to the above idea for a follow-up
experiment, the results of this dissertation suggest
additional directions for future research. Here are two ideas
for additional experiments.
Jenkins and Ward (1965) found that participants'
judgments of contingency were unrelated to the actual
contingency of the problems they performed. One criticism of
their experimental procedure has been that the 2R/20 task
they employed does not promote accurate judgment (Allen and
Jenkins, 1980) . Can participants make accurate judgments of
contingency on a 2R/20 task? Would feedback and practice have
the same effect on judgmental accuracy in a 2R/20 task as
they do in a 1R/10 task? I suspect that participants can make
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accurate judgments on a 2R/20 task and that feedback and
practice would have the same effect on judgments to this task
as on judgments to a 1R/10 task.
Another experiment would investigate the relation
between judgmental accuracy and self-efficacy. In their
contrast and assimilation experiment, Clark and Benassi (in
press) found that when a judgment task was relatively
difficult, participants with high levels of self-efficacy
showed more judgmental displacement from an anchor than
participants with low levels of self-efficacy. When the
judgment task was relatively easy, there was no systematic
difference between the amount of judgmental displacement of
participants with high versus low levels of self-efficacy. An
experiment could be conducted in which one group of
participants would judge relatively easy to discriminate
contingency problems while another group would judge
relatively difficult to discriminate contingency problems
(problems between - .50 and .50). What would the effects of
feedback and practice be on the self-efficacy of participants
in the two groups? How would self-efficacy influence
judgmental accuracy in this setting? Feedback and practice
might influence self-efficacy, especially for participants
who must make difficult judgments. Further, high levels of
self-efficacy might lead to greater judgmental accuracy,
especially for participants who must make the more difficult
judgments.
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Hogarth (1981) identified several ways in which most
judgment experiments are different from how we make judgments
in the real world. Two of the major differences are that in
the real world (a) people receive continual feedback and (b)
people make many judgments as part of an ongoing process. In
contrast, most experiments provide no feedback on the few
problems that participants judge. Hogarth claimed that
feedback is not only absent from most experiments, but that
its importance is not recognized on a theoretical level. This
assertion is true, for example, with respect to Crocker's
(1981) review article.
In her article, "Judgment of Covariation by Social
Perceivers," Crocker (1981) presented the extant judgment
literature as it fit into her conception of the six steps of
making judgments in the real world. Her steps are:
(l) decide what kinds of data to collect, (2)
sample cases from the population of cases, (3)
interpret the cases (i.e., code the data), (4)
recall the data that have been collected and
estimate the frequencies of confirming and
disconfirming cases, (5) integrate the evidence,
and (6) use the estimate as a basis for making
predictions or judgments, (p. 273)
Crocker's six steps lead to making "predictions or
judgments," but in reading her article it seems that these
predictions and judgments are onetime events with no
subsequent feedback. One could argue that people begin this
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process over again as soon as it is completed, and one could
even argue that these steps are used to evaluate feedback.
But Crocker's six steps of making judgments are not part of
an explicit feedback system. To make it so, a seventh step
would need to be added: (7) begin process over again,
evaluating feedback that result from judgment.
The contribution of the present research is that it
brings judgment of contingency research one step closer to
reflecting real-world judgments. As I indicated in the
Introduction, sensitivity to covariation is an important
prerequisite of adaptive behavior. Luckily, in the real world
we usually have feedback and many chances to get it right.
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